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THE IMPROPER DISMISSAL OF TITLE VII CLAIMS ON
“JURISDICTIONAL” EXHAUSTION GROUNDS:
HOW FEDERAL COURTS REQUIRE THAT ALLEGATIONS
BE PRESENTED TO AN AGENCY WITHOUT THE
RESOURCES TO CONSIDER THEM
Katherine A. Macfarlane*
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represents a watershed
moment in American history.1  With Title VII’s passage, Congress
acknowledged the need to “back” the civil rights movement with “fed-
eral legislative power.”2  Title VII was meant to eliminate practices
that inhibit employment opportunity equality.3  Beyond eliminating
those practices, Title VII was also designed to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate conduct that “fostered
racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority
citizens.”4  This Title renders unlawful the refusal or failure to hire or
“otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
* Litigation associate, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP.  I would like to thank the
gracious and talented editors of the George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal for their
careful work on this article.  I would also like to thank my mentor, Professor Allan Ides, for the
many helpful comments he provided while this article gestated.   Finally, unending thanks and
love to my patient fiance´ Tom Nolan, who reads my law review articles and still finds it in his
heart to make me dinner.
1 Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: A
Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 669 (2000).
2 Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne L. Rapp, Are We There Yet? Forty Years After the Pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act:  Revolution in the Workforce and the Unfulfilled Promises that
Remain, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 627, 627-28 (2005).
3 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (“Congress enacted Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating
those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971))).
4 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977) (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 800).
213
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gin, or to limit, segregate or classify any employee” for the same
improper reasons.5  A prima facie Title VII violation may be estab-
lished through policies or practices that are neutral on their face but
have a discriminatory effect.6
Recent appointees to the federal bench are skeptical of civil
rights cases in general, and employment discrimination cases in partic-
ular,7 and they are not alone.  There are many who still think that
employment discrimination plaintiffs are “whiners.”8  However, the
public’s perception of employment discrimination plaintiffs may be
evolving faster than the judiciary’s.
Anita Hill’s experiences are telling.  In 1991, following Hill’s tes-
timony in the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings, she received
letters from men who thought that sexual harassment was no more
than “the fantastic, vengeful invention of disgruntled employees or
spurned lovers.”9  However, sixteen years later, after a former New
York Knicks employee won an $11.6 million jury award in a sexual
harassment case, Ms. Hill received very different letters.  Over half of
the people who wrote were men, who, “through their own observa-
tions or the stories told them by their mothers, sisters, wives, and
daughters understand the problem [of sexual harassment at work] and
its harm.”10
Perhaps the best example of how the tide has turned on employ-
ment discrimination is the public reaction to Ledbetter v. The Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co.11  A wave of immediate public outrage
5 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
6 Stuart Biegel, School Choice Policy and Title VI:  Maximizing Equal Access for K-12 Stu-
dents in a Substantially Deregulated Educational Environment, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1533, 1546
(1995) (“Unlike Equal Protection plaintiffs, Title VII plaintiffs are generally able to prevail by
proving either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effects.”).
7 See Lee Reeves, Pragmatism Over Politics:  Recent Trends in Lower Court Employment
Discrimination Jurisprudence, 73 MO. L. REV. 481, 495 (2008) (citing evidence that “federal
judges have indeed made it increasingly difficult for employment discrimination plaintiffs to
prevail”).
8 See, e.g., Michael P. Maslanka, Fire Newly Hired Whiners Quickly, WORK MATTERS (Feb.
12, 2009), http://texaslawyer.typepad.com/work_matters/2009/02/fire-newly-hired-whiners-
quickly.html (Maslanka, managing partner of the 190-attorney law firm Ford & Harrison,
explains, with no hint of irony, that “employees who whine about their supervisor — he doesn’t
like me, she is rude to me, he doesn’t listen to me — will sooner or later claim that the boss
doesn’t like them because they are African American or a woman or over 40”).
9 Anita Hill, Discrimination, Harassment and the NBA, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 15, 2007, at
A11.
10 Id.
11 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
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followed the Supreme Court’s decision that Lilly Ledbetter’s equal
pay claim was time-barred.12  In fact, the decision was so disliked that
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Restoration Act was quickly passed to
overturn its holding, and President Obama selected it as the first bill
he signed into law.13  As President Obama put it,
It is fitting that with the very first bill I sign—the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Restoration Act . . . is upholding one of this nation[’]s first princi-
ples: that we are all created equal and each deserve a chance to pursue
our own version of happiness.14
The reaction was even more surprising given that the public was
reacting to the impact of a procedural rule: the statute of limitations,
“a technical legal topic.”15  Yet outrage over using procedure to defeat
civil rights claims is justified by Title VII’s history.  Title VII was
meant “to ‘make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a
meritorious suit.’”16  Title VII was meant to open, not shut, court-
house doors.
Thus, a plaintiff should have no trouble establishing that a federal
court has jurisdiction over a claim for employment discrimination
brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17  Title
VII is a law of the United States.  Correspondingly, jurisdiction should
vest as a result of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.18  Yet some federal courts require
much more than straightforward federal question jurisdiction to estab-
lish subject matter jurisdiction in Title VII cases.  To establish subject
matter jurisdiction for a Title VII claim in the District of Hawaii, “(1)
the plaintiff must timely file his claim with the EEOC; and (2) the
plaintiff must timely institute his action after receipt of a right-to-sue
notice.”19  Other courts have further held that subject matter jurisdic-
12 Young Eun Lee, Creating a Proper Incentive Structure: A Case Study of Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 117, 117 (2008).
13 Christina Bellantoni, Obama Signs Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/29/obama-signs-ledbetter-fair-pay-act/.
14 Id.
15 Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV.
499, 500 (2010).
16 Slade for Estate of Slade v. U.S. Postal Serv., 952 F.2d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting
New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980)).
17 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
18 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 505 (2006).
19 Gao v. Haw. Dept. of Atty. Gen., Cv. No. 09-00478, 2010 WL 99355, at *2 (D. Haw. Jan.
12, 2010).
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tion in Title VII cases only extends over allegations of discrimination
“‘like or reasonably related’ to the allegations” alleged in the initial
charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).20
If these three “jurisdictional” requirements—that a timely claim
be filed with the EEOC, that the EEOC issue a right-to-sue notice,
and that the allegations in the federal complaint track those made in
the original EEOC claim (presentment)—are satisfied, a plaintiff has
administratively exhausted his or her claim.21  Requiring exhaustion
makes little sense given the current understaffing of the already
overburdened EEOC and the procedures followed by that agency to
pursue the initial filed charge; yet the circuits agree that administra-
tive exhaustion in Title VII cases is required.22  However, there is sub-
stantial disagreement over whether the presentment requirement,
which requires that the scope of the allegations presented in federal
court mimics the scope of the allegations in the EEOC claim, is a
requirement that may be excused under certain circumstances.23
Why would any federal court add to the “procedural minefield”24
a Title VII plaintiff must overcome to take her claim to trial by requir-
ing compliance with administrative procedures before an agency that
lacks the ability to enforce Title VII?  This Article attempts to answer
that question.  Part I discusses the administrative exhaustion doctrine
in the context of administrative law, explaining how the doctrine pro-
tects an agency’s ability to enforce the very laws it was created to
enforce.25  Part II examines Title VII and the EEOC, and contends
that, far from enforcing Title VII, the EEOC is no more than an
administrative waiting room.26  Part II also tracks how a charge would
be processed if the EEOC had sufficient resources to handle each
20 Epps v. Phoenix Elementary Sch. Dist., No. CV-07-1024, 2009 WL 996308, at *2 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 14, 2009) (quoting Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)).
21 See infra Part III.A-B.
22 Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456
F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2006); Jorge v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556, 564 (1st Cir. 2005); Francis v. City
of N.Y., 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 2000); Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020 (3d. Cir.
1997); Tolbert v. United States, 916 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1990).
23 See infra Part III.B.
24 Sullivan, supra note 15, at 507 (“It is fair to say that the run-up to a Title VII suit is a R
procedural minefield, which is especially unfortunate given that the structure is designed to be
initiated by individuals without the assistance of private attorneys.”).
25 See infra Part I.
26 See infra Part II.
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charge filed.27  Part II concludes that while these procedures are admi-
rable, their benefits are illusory.28
Part III describes how federal courts have incorrectly taken the
administrative procedures that begin and end the EEOC’s processing
of a charge and converted them into “administrative exhaustion”
requirements for Title VII suits in federal court.29  Courts believe that
these requirements are justified in terms of the notice they provide to
both accused employers and the EEOC itself.30  Ideally, if the EEOC
has notice of a charge, then it also has the opportunity to resolve the
charge informally.  This comports with the original purpose of Title
VII—that it was meant to be enforced informally, and not through
litigation.31  However, because the EEOC is in effect unable to inves-
tigate charges or bring suit on the filer’s behalf, this justification is
unpersuasive.
Part IV focuses on presentment, arguing that the circuits that
treat presentment as a jurisdictional requirement are wrong on several
grounds.32  First, Supreme Court precedent indicates that presentment
should be treated as a prudential requirement.33  Those circuits that
consider presentment a jurisdictional requirement violate Supreme
Court precedent regarding the waivability of exhaustion require-
ments.34  Second, far more fundamental concepts, such as personal
jurisdiction, are waivable; there is no reason to elevate any aspect of
administrative exhaustion above personal jurisdiction.35  Third, requir-
ing that a Title VII plaintiff allege every claim that it brings in federal
court in its EEOC charge enforces an impermissible standard of
heightened notice pleading on Title VII plaintiffs.36
Part V explains that treating any aspect of administrative exhaus-
tion as a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction has a dire effect on
a Title VII plaintiff’s chances of prevailing on the merits and perpetu-
ates an error in law.37  Because a subject matter jurisdiction defense is
27 See infra Part II.B.
28 See infra Part II.C.
29 See infra Part III.
30 See infra Part III.C.
31 See infra Part III.C.
32 See infra Part IV.
33 See infra Part IV.A.
34 See infra Part IV.B-C.
35 See infra Part IV.D.
36 See infra Part IV.E.
37 See infra Part V.
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never waived and may be raised by a federal court sua sponte, the
labeling of administrative exhaustion as “jurisdictional” is far more
than a matter of semantics; rather, treating any aspect of exhaustion as
a jurisdictional prerequisite defeats otherwise meritorious claims at
every stage of litigation.38  Furthermore, because subject matter juris-
diction objections are procedural objections, every time the defense is
invoked, courts do not reach the merits of a Title VII claim and do not
develop the substantive law.39
Part VI suggests that inexperienced writers are the reason that
improper exhaustion requirements are propagated in Title VII cases.40
The treatment of the exhaustion issue in existing Title VII opinions,
and the increasing likelihood that law clerks and externs write the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction portions of opinions, often foreclose further
inquiry into the correctness of the rule.41  Moreover, because federal
judges do not receive Title VII training as they are immune from Title
VII suits, the judiciary is prevented from gaining a deeper understand-
ing of the effects of the law that it creates.42
I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
The notion that administrative exhaustion is a prerequisite to
subject matter jurisdiction requires some explanation.  That a plaintiff
with a claim arising under federal law must take additional steps to
establish that a court may hear its claim is counterintuitive, whether in
the context of Title VII or any other established federal statutory
right.  Therefore, before arguing that Title VII plaintiffs should be
able to bring claims in federal court even if the facts underlying those
claims were not presented to the EEOC, this Article begins by
explaining why a plaintiff’s conduct before the EEOC or any other
administrative agency may later affect a federal court’s jurisdiction.
Congress created some administrative agencies, like the EEOC,
for the express purpose of enforcing certain statutes, like Title VII.43
Although the EEOC is a well-known agency, its function remains a bit
38 See infra Part V.
39 See infra Part V.
40 See infra Part VI.
41 See infra Part VI.
42 See infra Part VI.
43 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (stating Congress created
EEOC to enforce Title VII).
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of a mystery to the public.  The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), another federal agency better known to the public, was also
created by Congress to administer a federal statute, the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).44  The NLRA protects employees’
rights to organize and bargain collectively.45  In fact, the NLRA cre-
ated the NLRB to enforce its substantive provisions.46  The NLRB
acts as a quasi-judicial body with jurisdiction to decide labor issues
arising under the NLRA.47
Exhaustion, an administrative law doctrine, requires parties with
claims arising under certain statutes to pursue their claims first with an
agency like the EEOC or the NLRB before seeking judicial relief.48
Exhaustion allows agencies the first chance “to resolve issues over
which [they have] primary responsibility.”49  Indeed, if exhaustion
were not required, the agencies would be rendered meaningless
because litigants could bypass the agency and file directly in federal
court.
Exhaustion requires that every administrative process the agency
has created to remedy a violation be engaged, and the agency must be
allowed to reach a final decision regarding the alleged violation.
Exhaustion gives agencies the opportunity to “develop the necessary
factual background upon which decisions should be based” without
judicial interruption.50
The exhaustion requirement has been likened to the final judg-
ment rule, which limits the category of cases that may be appealed
before the entry of a final judgment in federal district court.51
Appeals that come before judgment “may cause disruption, delay, and
expense for the litigants; they also burden appellate courts by requir-
ing immediate consideration of issues that may become moot or irrel-
44 Fact Sheet, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/over-
view/fact_sheet.aspx (last visited Dec. 22, 2010).
45 Id. 
46 Ross E. Davies, Remedial Nonacquiescence, 89 IOWA L. REV. 65, 82 (2003).
47 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 44. R
48 McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938)).
49 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 8397 (1st ed. 1982).
50 McKart, 395 U.S. at 194.
51 Id. (“The very same reasons lie behind judicial rules sharply limiting interlocutory
appeals.”).
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evant by the end of trial.”52  The concerns with respect to judicial
intervention before an agency has completed its review are similar:
judicial review of agency action, like interlocutory review, may be
both premature and disruptive.
While important and generally mandatory, “[a]pplication of the
doctrine to specific cases requires an understanding of its purposes
and of the particular administrative scheme involved.”53
Federal courts require exhaustion for one of two reasons.  First,
exhaustion may be mandated by statute.  This kind of exhaustion is
labeled “jurisdictional exhaustion.”  When Congress inserts an
exhaustion requirement into a statute, and as a result, “requires resort
to the administrative process as a predicate to judicial review,” Con-
gress has created a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement.54  This form
of exhaustion is not related to courts’ prudential powers, but rather is
based on Congress’ power to control federal courts’ jurisdiction.55  To
require mandatory exhaustion, a statute must contain “‘[s]weeping
and direct’ statutory language indicating that there is no federal juris-
diction prior to exhaustion, or the exhaustion requirement is treated
as an element of the underlying claim.’”56  Mandatory exhaustion, as
its name suggests, is not waivable.  A jurisdictional administrative
exhaustion requirement establishes subject matter jurisdiction
because the statutory provisions conferring federal jurisdiction do so
only with respect to administratively-exhausted claims.  Because juris-
dictional exhaustion must be expressly created, the presumption is
that exhaustion is not jurisdictional.57
Second, courts have created a judicial doctrine of prudential
exhaustion to require parties “who seek to challenge agency action to
exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing their case
to court.”58  Prudential exhaustion serves a similar purpose to jurisdic-
tional exhaustion, “giving agencies the opportunity to correct their
own errors, affording parties and courts the benefits of agencies’
52 Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987).
53 McKart, 395 U.S. at 193.
54 Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
55 Id. (citing EEOC v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 186 F.3d 959, 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
56 Id. at 1248 (quoting Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 757 (1975)).
57 Id. (citing I.A.M. Nat’l Pension Fund Benefit Plan C v. Stockton TRI Indus., 727 F.2d
1204, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
58 Id. at 1247 (citing 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.2
(4th ed. 2002)).
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expertise, [and] compiling a record adequate for judicial review[.]”59
However, because prudential exhaustion is not required by statute, it
may be waived on numerous grounds, including if “the litigant’s inter-
ests in immediate judicial review outweigh the government’s interests
in the efficiency or administrative autonomy that the exhaustion doc-
trine is designed to further.”60
This Article focuses on one particular aspect of administrative
exhaustion—the “presentment” requirement—and contends that it is
non-jurisdictional for Title VII plaintiffs.  Under the presentment rule,
“one must raise issues with the agency or lose the right to challenge
those issues on review.”61  Presentment is a key part of the exhaustion
doctrine, and Title VII is not the only statute for which courts have
implied a presentment requirement.62  Yet the Supreme Court has
cautioned that although the requirement that an issue be presented to
an agency is a common non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement, it is
not appropriate to require it in all instances.63
“The basis for a judicially imposed issue-exhaustion requirement
is an analogy to the rule that appellate courts will not consider argu-
ments not raised before trial courts.”64  That is, issues not raised at the
trial level should not be heard for the first time on appeal because the
trial court is better equipped to conduct fact finding.65  In the adminis-
trative context, “courts require administrative issue exhaustion ‘as a
general rule’ because it is usually ‘appropriate under [an agency’s]
practice’ for ‘contestants in an adversary proceeding’ before it to
develop fully all issues there.”66  However, when an administrative
proceeding is not adversarial, the need for issue exhaustion
dissipates.67
In Sims v. Apfel, the Supreme Court considered whether the
administrative proceedings that determine whether Social Security
59 Id. (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145-46 (1992); Marine Mammal Con-
servancy, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric., 134 F.3d 409, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
60 Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting McCarthy,
503 U.S. at 146).
61 WRIGHT & KOCH, supra note 49, at § 8398. R
62 See id.
63 Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 108-10 (2000).
64 Id. at 108-09.
65 Id. at 109 (citing Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941)).
66 Id. (quoting United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 36-37 (1952)).
67 Id. at 110.
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benefits should be awarded are adversarial.68  The Court concluded
they were not.69  A party seeking Social Security benefits presents its
reasons to an administrative law judge (ALJ), who must “investigate
the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting
benefits.”70  A party denied benefits may appeal to the Social Security
Appeals Council, but the party’s opponent, the Social Security admin-
istration, “has no representative before the ALJ to oppose the claim
for benefits, and . . . [does not] oppose[ ] claimants before the Coun-
cil.”71  And accordingly, “A person whose claim for Social Security
benefits is denied by an [ALJ]” has not waived issues he did not
include in his appeal request to the Social Security Appeals Council.72
An issue not raised before the Appeals Council may be raised in fed-
eral court for the first time.  In the context of Social Security benefits
proceedings, “a judicially created issue-exhaustion requirement is
inappropriate.”73
II. HOW THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
ENFORCES TITLE VII:  THEORY AND PRACTICE
Federal courts enforce administrative exhaustion requirements in
Title VII cases.  However, when they do so, they pay homage to an
administrative agency that is very different than the actual EEOC.
The federal courts’ insistence that plaintiffs resort to the EEOC dem-
onstrates a lack of understanding of how the EEOC’s investigation of
a charge begins, let alone why the EEOC’s investigation, mediation,
and potential litigation is essential to Title VII’s enforcement, or if the
EEOC has a chance to investigate every charge brought before it.
Before critiquing federal courts’ approach to administrative exhaus-
tion, this Article briefly reviews Title VII’s purpose,74 the EEOC’s
role in Title VII enforcement, and what should,75 and actually does,76
happen when a charge is filed.  This Part contends that the EEOC is
68 See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000).
69 See id. at 105.
70 Id. at 110-11 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1971))
71 Id. at 111.
72 Id. at 104-05.
73 Id. at 112.
74 See infra Part II.A.
75 See infra Part II.B.
76 See infra Part II.C.
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so ineffective that the deference federal courts give its procedure is
nonsensical.
A. The Purpose of Title VII and the EEOC
As mentioned above, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
represents a watershed moment in American history.77  With Title
VII’s passage, Congress acknowledged the need to “back” the civil
rights movement with “federal legislative power.”78  Title VII is in
many ways a radical statute, created “to combat a deficiency in the
market, namely inappropriate discrimination, which had the effect of
placing parties in unequal bargaining positions.”79  Title VII makes it
easier to prove an employment discrimination claim than to prove an
equal protection claim based on sex or race—unlike an equal protec-
tion claim, a prima facie Title VII violation may be established
through policies or practices that are neutral on their face, but have a
discriminatory effect.80
Title VII was meant to eliminate practices that inhibit employ-
ment opportunity equality.81  Title VII renders unlawful the refusal or
failure to hire or “otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, or to limit, segregate or classify” any employee for the
same improper reasons.82  Alongside Title VII, Congress created the
EEOC.  The EEOC was designed to act as Title VII’s lead enforce-
ment agency83 instead of regular litigation.  Rather, the EEOC was
77 Belton, supra note 1, at 669. R
78 Barnard & Rapp, supra note 2, at 627-28. R
79 Rangel v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 996 F. Supp. 1093, 1097 (D.N.M. 1998).
80 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (“Under [Title VII], practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be main-
tained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”);
Biegel, supra note 6, at 1546 (“Unlike Equal Protection plaintiffs, Title VII plaintiffs are gener- R
ally able to prevail by proving either discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effects.”).
81 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (“Congress enacted Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating
those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs, 401 U.S. at
429-30))).
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) – (2) (2006).
83 See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 44 (stating Congress created EEOC to enforce Title
VII); H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, at 11 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401.
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meant to serve a unique purpose in Title VII’s enforcement, giving
employers and employees the chance to settle disputes informally.84
The EEOC was given the power to mediate employment disputes in
order to render litigation rare.85  In fact, Title VII was not a statute
intended to “breed litigation;” rather, it was intended to encourage
“voluntary resolution of all but the most serious types of
discrimination.”86
At first, the EEOC could only investigate an attempt to infor-
mally settle, or “conciliate,” discrimination charges.87  But with the
passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the
EEOC was given the power to file suit against public and private
employers and labor unions for Title VII violations.88  The 1972 Act
also “authorized the EEOC to award compensatory damages in [cer-
tain] Federal Government employment discrimination cases,” as well
as the power to require reinstatement or hiring of employees with or
without back pay.89  However, the EEOC cannot award damages,
reinstate employees, or award back pay in private sector disputes.90
Moreover, litigation only proceeds after informal settlement fails.  If
the EEOC worked as intended, Title VII litigation would be infre-
quent.  However, as of 2006, Title VII cases represented six percent of
the federal civil docket.91
84 See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 44 (noting Congress intended “[c]ooperation and
voluntary compliance [to be] . . .  the preferred means” for settling disputes).
85 See id.; Edwards v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199, 203 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
86 Lauren LeGrand, Note, Proving Retaliation After Burlington v. White, 52 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1221, 1223 (2008) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, at 3, 11 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2392, 2401).
87 See Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 44 (“Congress created the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and established a procedure whereby existing state and local equal
employment opportunity agencies, as well as the Commission, would have an opportunity to
settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion before the aggrieved party was
permitted to file a lawsuit.”).
88 Id. The Act gave federal employees the same rights as private individuals bringing
employment discrimination claims.  Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda, Cal., 404 F.
Supp. 377, 388 (N.D. Cal. 1975).  This Article examines administrative exhaustion rules that are
applied to both private and public sector claims.  Where there are differences, they are noted.
89 West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 217-18 (1999).
90 See Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidiscrimina-
tion Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 202 n.53
(2009) (“The EEOC also has the power to adjudicate federal claims, but not adjudicate private
sector disputes.”).
91 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Fed-
eral Court:  From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 103-04 (2009) (finding that in
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B. Filing an Employment Discrimination Charge with the EEOC:
In Theory
The EEOC’s website proclaims that the EEOC “enforces
[f]ederal laws prohibiting employment discrimination.”92  To receive
the EEOC’s help, an individual who believes that he or she was dis-
criminated against on the job must first file a “charge” with the EEOC
describing the allegedly discriminatory conduct.93  A charge is a writ-
ten, sworn statement that alleges a violation of Title VII has
occurred.94  The charge is directed against a “respondent” who is
either a person or an organization bound by Title VII.95  The charge
may be filed in person at the EEOC’s Washington, D.C., offices, with
any designated EEOC representative, or at any EEOC district or area
office.96  The EEOC charge must be filed within 180 days of the
alleged discriminatory practice.97
The EEOC requires that the charge contain:  (1) the name,
address and telephone number of the person making the charge; (2)
the name and address of the person against whom the charge is made,
if known; (3) “[a] clear and concise statement of the facts, including
pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment prac-
2006, such cases represented nearly six percent of the federal docket and that in 2001, such cases
were the largest share of federal civil cases).
92 Employees and Job Applicants, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.
eeoc.gov/employees/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 24, 2010).
93 EMP. COORDINATOR, EMP. PRACS. § 84:3 (West 2010).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at § 84:21 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.8. (2009)).
97 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006).  In Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Supreme Court held that “[t]he EEOC charging period is
triggered when a discrete unlawful practice takes place,” but that “[a] new violation does not
occur, and a new charging period does not commence, upon the occurrence of subsequent non-
discriminatory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from the past discrimination.”  550 U.S.
618, 628 (2007).  Congress passed the Fair Pay Act to overturn Ledbetter. See Onyiah v. St.
Cloud State Univ., 655 F. Supp. 2d 948, 961 (D. Minn. 2009).  “[T]he Fair Pay Act changed the
definition of unlawful employment practices, as it relates to pay discrimination claims under
Title VII,” providing:
[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensa-
tion in violation of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or other prac-
tice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation
decision or other practice, or when an individual is affected by application of a discrimina-
tory compensation decision or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or
other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other
practice.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)).
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tice; (4) [i]f known, the approximate number of employees of the
respondent employer or the approximate number of members of the
respondent labor organization, as the case may be; and (5) [a] state-
ment disclosing whether proceedings involving the alleged unlawful
employment practice have been commenced before a State or local
agency charged with the enforcement of fair employment practice
laws . . . .”98  Despite these requirements, the EEOC will not dismiss a
charge prior to commencing an investigation so long as the charge is
“sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally
the action or practices complained of.”99
These minimal requirements stand in stark contrast to the stan-
dards federal courts impose upon the charge.  Federal courts require
that the charge give both the EEOC and employers “notice” of the
sort of discrimination claim that the charging party might eventually
bring in federal court.  Once the charge is brought in federal court,
federal courts impose a rule akin to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure onto the charge, a document created before the litiga-
tion commenced.100
However, according to the EEOC, all that must be listed in a
charge to avoid pre-investigation dismissal is contact information for
the charging party and the employer, but only “if known;” a statement
of relevant facts and dates, not claims; and, “if known,” information
regarding the number of persons the employer employs.101   The
requirements are general and lenient.  Notably, most EEOC charges
are completed by the complaining parties themselves, not lawyers.102
Once the charge is received, the EEOC must notify the respon-
dent accused of discriminatory conduct within 10 days.103  After notice
is sent, the EEOC’s investigation begins.  The EEOC will arrange for
an in-person intake interview with the individual who filed a charge,
conducted by an Equal Opportunity Specialist (EOS).  “This inter-
view begins with a counseling session at which the EOS answers ques-
98 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (2009).
99 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (2009).
100 See, e.g., EEOC v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776, 779 (7th Cir.
2007) (finding that an EEOC complaint must satisfy the standard in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
101 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (2009). See text accompanying note 98. R
102 Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Taylor v. W & S.
Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1195 (7th Cir. 1992)).
103 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)(2006).
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tions regarding the EEOC’s operations,” and explains the extent of
the EEOC’s power.104  During the interview, the EOS is not limited to
asking questions about the charge-filer’s allegations.  The EOS may
inquire about any discrimination, including violations affecting other
individuals.105  In the course of its investigation, the EEOC may
request that both the charging party and the respondent employer
provide information regarding the charge’s allegations.106  For exam-
ple, an employer may be asked to submit a “statement of position”
through which it describes its version of events.107  The EEOC may
also conduct an on-site visit of the employer’s offices.108
The EEOC’s investigation is not curtailed by the scope of the
allegations in the charge.109  The EEOC may look into violations that
are not alleged in the charge.  For example, the EEOC requires
EEOC employees investigating Title VII allegations who also uncover
uncharged Equal Pay Act violations in the course of the Title VII
investigation to pursue the Equal Pay Act violation “regardless of the
scope of the charge.”110  Further, during an investigation, the EEOC is
entitled to examine any evidence relevant to the charge111 and has
access “to virtually any material that might cast light on the allega-
tions against the employer.”112  If an employer refuses to provide the
requested information voluntarily, Title VII authorizes the EEOC to
issue a subpoena and to seek an order enforcing it.113  The EEOC in
no way imposes a presentment requirement on the contents of the
charge.  If it deems an issue relevant, it makes no difference whether
that issue was included in the charge initially.
After it completes its investigation, the EEOC will decide
whether there is reasonable cause to believe a charge’s allegations are
valid.  If the EEOC decides that a charge has no merit, then it will be
104 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR, supra note 93, at § 84:28 (citing EEOC, COMPLIANCE R
MANUAL § 2.4(a) (2009)).
105 Id.
106 The Charge Handling Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.
eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
107 Id. 
108 Id.
109 See EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 104, at § 22.3(a). R
110 Id. (describing investigation scope).
111 EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984).
112 Id.
113 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 191 (1990) (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (2006)).
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dismissed, and the charging party will receive notice that he or she has
the right to file suit in federal court.114  If the EEOC finds that there is
reasonable cause to believe that discrimination did occur, the parties
may be invited to participate in informal settlement of their dispute.115
If no compromise can be reached, the EEOC may elect to prosecute
the charge itself, or will notify the charging party that it may sue on its
own behalf.116
A federal lawsuit alleging Title VII violations may only be filed if
a charging party first receives notice of a right to sue, also known as a
right-to-sue letter.117  A right-to-sue letter will be issued if the EEOC
finds that a charge lacks merit, or if no informal settlement can be
reached.118   A charging party may also receive a right-to-sue letter in
two additional instances.  He or she may request a right-to-sue letter,
and the EEOC must issue one, if more than 180 days have passed
since the charge was filed.119  A right-to-sue letter will also issue
before 180 days have passed if the EEOC determines that it will be
unable to complete its investigation within 180 days.120
Therefore, receipt of a right-to-sue letter has no connection to the
completion of an EEOC investigation.  Rather, receipt of a right-to-
sue letter communicates that the EEOC can do nothing more with a
particular charge, and that the charging party should file suit on its
own behalf if it wishes to pursue its allegations any further.  Yet,
receipt of a right-to-sue letter in federal court establishes an element
of administrative exhaustion, even if no administrative action was
taken.
114 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, The Charge Handling Process, supra note
106; Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/employ- R
ees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
115 Kara M. Farina, Comment, When Does Discrimination “Occur?”: The Supreme Court’s
Limitation on an Employee’s Ability to Challenge Discriminatory Pay Under Title VII, 38
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 249, 254-55 (2008) (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)).
116 Id. (citing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-f(1)).
117 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Filing a Lawsuit, supra note 114. R
118 Filing a Charge of Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://
www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
119 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Filing a Lawsuit, supra note 114. R
120 Id.
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Once a claimant receives a notice of the right to sue, the EEOC
“will close the case and take no further action.”121  After a right-to-sue
letter is received, a charging party has 90 days to file suit.122
A right-to-sue letter is itself evidence that the EEOC has author-
ized a claimant to bring suit.123  The EEOC’s letter must expressly
state that it is a document authorizing suit, and that any suit in federal
court must be filed within 90 days.124  The letter must also include
“[a]dvice concerning the institution of such civil action by the person
claiming to be aggrieved, where appropriate,” as well as a copy of the
initial charge and “[t]he Commission’s decision, determination, or
dismissal.”125
C. Filing an Employment Discrimination Charge with the EEOC:
In Practice
If effective, the EEOC procedures would reduce Title VII litiga-
tion and enable mediation for employment discrimination suits falling
under the statute.  However, the EEOC’s powers are limited, not just
by statute but also by its own lack of resources.  The EEOC cannot
award damages, reinstate employees, or award back pay in private
sector disputes.126  It also cannot issue regulations that have the force
of law.127  Practically, the EEOC is unable to effectively discharge its
duties within the time frame provided by statute.
On April 2, 2009, Gabrielle Martin, the president of the union
that represents EEOC employees, testified before the House Appro-
priations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies regarding the proposed fiscal year 2010 budget for the
EEOC.128  Martin begged the committee to save the EEOC, painting a
picture of an agency in disarray.  Her testimony highlighted the fol-
lowing problems:
121 Id.
122 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006).
123 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(1) (2009).
124 Id.
125 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(e)(2)-(4) (2009).
126 See McCormick, supra note 90, at 202 n.53. R
127 Id.
128 Statements of Members of Congress and Other Interested Individuals and Organizations:
Hearing on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2010 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. On Appropriations, 111th Cong. 38 (2009) (statement of Gabrielle
Martin, President, National Council of EEOC Locals).
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• Since 2001, the EEOC has lost over twenty-five percent of its
employees, ending 2008 “with only 2,174 employees on board
nationwide”;129
• The EEOC has only 600 available investigators, who, in 2008,
“received 95,402 new charges of discrimination, the highest num-
ber ever received in agency history”;130
• In 2008, “for the second year in a row the backlog of cases jumped
35%: to 73,941”;131
• Each EEOC investigator has an inventory of “as high as 250
cases,” an “unreasonably high caseload[ ]” that “do[es] not allow
investigators to do an effective job of interviewing witness[es],
reviewing documents, attempting conciliation”;132
• The EEOC’s charge backlog “has grown from 39,000 in [2006] to
54,000 in [2007] and to 73,941 in [2008]”;133
• The charge backlog represents “an enormous pile” of “people who
believe they were discriminated against on the job, still waiting for
help”;134
• “[T]he amount of time it takes to process a case [from initial
charge to the issuance of a right-to-sue letter] has increased to 229
days”;135
• “[I]n the summer of 2008, EEOC scrapped its requirement that
72% of its charges be processed within 180 days” instead requiring
that “only 48% of charges be processed within 180 days”;136
• In 2009, the EEOC “beg[an] enforcement of two new laws, the
Genetic Information Non Discrimination Act (GINA) and the
Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act”;137
129 Id. at 41.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. (internal citation omitted).
133 Id. 
134 Statements of Members of Congress and Other Interested Individuals and Organizations:
Hearing on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2010 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. On Appropriations, 111th Cong. 41 (2009) (statement of Gabrielle
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• “[W]hile additional staff have not been hired to assist with the new
work, existing staff have not been trained on the complexities of
the new laws.”138
Mainstream media outlets have also noticed the EEOC’s
problems, reporting, for example, that in 2008, 95,400 charges of job
bias in the private sector were filed, but only 290 suits were brought.139
“[T]he backlog at the end of fiscal year 2010 is projected to be 87,807
cases.”140  According to a 2009 internal audit, “The EEOC has not
embarked on major program initiatives to reduce the inventory or to
reduce the growth of the inventory in over 10 years.”141  The EEOC
itself was found to have violated the Fair Labor Standards Act on a
nationwide basis with respect to how it paid its own employees.142
EEOC employees face added pressure due to limited staffing.
The loss of over twenty-five percent of its staff “includ[es] investiga-
tors and lawyers who handle the cases.”143  During the Bush adminis-
tration, “[r]esources . . . languished” and “[t]he agency’s requests to
hire support staff, investigators, attorneys, administrative judges and
mediators to replace those who departed the agency [were] largely
unheeded.”144  The agency received an additional $23 million in late
2009 and was planning to hire 200 new investigators.145
The number of backlogged charges is the most striking statistic,
even though exactly what a backlogged charge is remains unclear.  A
backlogged charge may simply be a charge for which an investigation
cannot be completed within 180 days, but it may also be a charge for
which no investigation has begun.  In 2008, “fewer than half of private
sector discrimination charges filed in [2008] were resolved within 180
days.”146  That is, most charges filed in 2008 were not processed within
138 Id. 
139 Steve Vogel, EEOC Struggles With Huge Workload, Diminished Staff, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/02/AR2
009020202452.html.
140 Jenna Greene, Has Obama Redirected the Regulatory System?, NAT. L.J., Jan. 18, 2010,
available at Westlaw 1/18/2010 NAT’L L.J. 11 (Col. 1).
141 Id.
142 Steve Vogel, EEOC Willfully Violated Pay Law, Arbitrator Rules, WASH. POST, March
31, 2009, available at  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/30/
AR2009033002901.html.
143 Id. (quoting an annual report by EEOC Inspector General Aletha Brown).
144 Vogel, supra note 139. R
145 Id.
146 Id.
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180 days, meaning no investigation was completed or possibly even
started.
The EEOC’s website represents that as of 2004, it took nearly six
months, that is, less than 180 days, to complete an average charge
investigation; at the completion of such an investigation, a right-to-sue
letter would issue if the EEOC did not bring suit itself.147  In light of
Martin’s testimony and the media coverage, this estimate is outdated.
That most investigations will not be completed within 180 days is a
key fact.  Right-to-sue letters may be issued at the claimant’s request
after 180 days have passed and the EEOC has yet to complete an
investigation.  By virtue of allowing right-to-sue letters to be issued at
the 180-day mark, when most investigations will not have been
resolved, the EEOC has created a mechanism to allow the majority of
charges filed to bypass an EEOC investigation entirely.  In essence,
the EEOC’s investigatory and conciliatory powers have been ren-
dered meaningless.  The press has noticed, and Congress has heard
testimony about the problem.  Yet the federal courts require plaintiffs
to resort to the EEOC as though it still has the ability to resolve Title
VII violations using its full procedural capabilities.
III. COMPLIANCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES AS
PREREQUISITE TO FEDERAL SUIT
Despite the realities of EEOC enforcement, federal courts pay lip
service to the EEOC’s ability to resolve Title VII disputes.  The
administrative procedures that encompass the EEOC’s involvement in
resolving a charge’s allegations are referred to in federal jurispru-
dence as the elements of “administrative exhaustion.”148  Two of these
exhaustion elements can be traced to statutory language.149  The third,
presentment, is judicially created.150  Some courts consider these
administrative exhaustion elements mandatory prerequisites to filing a
Title VII suit in federal court.151  However, neither a right-to-sue letter
147 The Charge Handling Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.
eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited Dec. 25, 2010) (“How long the investigation takes
depends on a lot of different things, including the amount of information that needs to be gath-
ered and analyzed. It took us – on average – nearly 6 months to investigate a charge in 2004.”).
148 See infra Part III.A.
149 See infra Part III.A.
150 See infra Part III.B.
151 Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 523 (1972) (“A person claiming to be aggrieved by a
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . may not maintain a suit for redress in
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nor the initial claims made to the agency is an outcome  that necessa-
rily indicates the full extent of agency processing of a Title VII claim.
Rather, an agency can issue a right-to-sue letter even if the agency is
unable to investigate a claim.152  Further, claimants can change their
initial claims during the course of investigation by an agency.153
A. Filing a Timely Charge and Receiving a Right-to-Sue Letter
Federal courts describe administrative exhaustion in Title VII
cases as a two-step process:  first, a timely charge must be filed with
the EEOC; second, a right-to-sue letter must be received, and suit
must be brought within a certain amount of time after the letter’s
receipt.154 According to federal jurisprudence, both the right-to-sue
letter requirement and the timely filing requirement are essential to
establishing “administrative exhaustion,” which in turn is a prerequi-
site to bringing a Title VII suit.155  These two requirements come from
Section 2000e-5 of the Title VII statute.156
B. Presentment
Plaintiffs may face another important hurdle to bringing a Title
VII claim in federal court.  Some federal courts will only consider dis-
crimination allegations that are like or reasonably related to the alle-
gations in an initial EEOC charge.157  This requires an individual filing
a charge with the EEOC to look ahead to the claims it may wish to
bring in a federal lawsuit at the time the charge is filed.  However,
Congress did not include a presentment requirement in Title VII’s
statutory language.  Rather, federal courts created the presentment
requirement.
Whether a charge was timely filed or a right-to-sue letter was
issued are relatively straightforward inquiries.  Timely filing can be
federal district court until he has first unsuccessfully pursued certain avenues of potential admin-
istrative relief.”).
152 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) (2009).
153 Id.
154 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
155 See, e.g., Jorge v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556, 564 (1st Cir. 2005).
156 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
157 See, e.g., B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Allegations
of discrimination not included in the plaintiff’s administrative charge may not be considered by a
federal court unless the new claims are like or reasonably related to the allegations contained in
the EEOC charge.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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proven by comparing the date a charge was filed with the date of the
original discriminatory conduct alleged in a federal complaint.  If a
plaintiff can produce a right-to-sue letter, then she will have satisfied
the right-to-sue letter requirement. Enforcing the presentment
requirement, however, requires courts to compare the facts underly-
ing an EEOC charge with the allegations presented in a federal
complaint.
In Hungate v. Winter, a 2007 Southern District of California case,
one of the plaintiff’s discrimination claims was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because it was not presented to the EEOC.158 Hungate is
an example of how a federal court determines whether the present-
ment element is satisfied.159  Maria Alicia Hungate, a Mexican Ameri-
can woman, worked for the Navy for 17 years.160  During that time,
she suffered from ankle, wrist, hand, and spinal disc problems.161
Hungate was fired in August 2004.162  Believing that she had been ter-
minated as the result of unlawful discrimination, she contacted her
unit’s Human Resources department.163
The Hungate court dismissed one of Hungate’s federal claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction by retracing her actions after her
initial contact with Human Resources.164  The court noted that Hun-
gate filed a “written complaint” with the EEOC on September 27,
2004.165  The court noted that in that complaint, Hungate “checked a
box indicating that she wished to allege disability discrimination.”166
158 Hungate v. Winter, 05CV2296, 2007 WL 1975436 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2007).
159 Id. at *7.




164 Hungate v. Winter, 05CV2296, 2007 WL 1975436, at *7 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2007).
165 The rules applicable to federal employees like Hungate are substantively similar to
those that apply to private sector employees. See Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 75 (2d
Cir. 2008) (stating that “the requirement that a federal employee bring a complaint to his or her
EEO for resolution . . . [is] analogous to the requirement that a private sector employee first
bring a complaint to the attention of the [EEOC] for resolution.” (quoting Terry v. Ashcroft, 336
F.3d 128, 150 (2d Cir. 2003))).  The document that triggers an investigation for federal employees
who complain of discriminatory conduct is referred to as a formal complaint, as opposed to a
charge. Filing a Formal Complaint, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://
www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/filing_complaint.cfm (last visited Dec. 18, 2010).  A charge
must contain the same information as a formal complaint. Compare id. (formal complaint) with
How to File a Charge of Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,  http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/howtofile.cfm (last visited Dec. 18, 2010) (charge).
166 Hungate, 2007 WL 1975436, at *2.
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On November 19, 2004, Hungate was interviewed by an Equal
Employment Opportunity counselor.167  The counselor prepared a
written report following the interview, which described the basis of
Hungate’s complaint as “harassment due to physical disability.”168
However, the report also noted that Hungate described several inci-
dents of discrimination and that “[o]ne of the incidents . . . alleged was
an incident where [Hungate’s] supervisor, Gloria Case, asked [Hun-
gate] to speak English after hearing [Hungate] speaking Spanish at
work.”169
Hungate filed another complaint with the EEOC on December
30, 2004, and again checked a box indicating that she had been dis-
criminated against on the basis of her physical disabilities.170  The
EEOC dismissed Hungate’s complaint as untimely.171  When Hungate
appealed, she did not allege that her complaint should have been con-
strued as alleging anything other than disability discrimination.172
In her federal complaint, brought after the EEOC dismissed her
administrative complaint, Hungate alleged two claims:  (1) disability
discrimination; and (2) that “Defendant also harassed and discrimi-
nated against Plaintiff on the basis of Plaintiff’s race, national origin,
and/or ancestry in violation of Title VII.”173
Hungate’s disability claim was dismissed as untimely.174  The
court also dismissed Hungate’s claim that she was discriminated
against on the basis of race, national origin, or ancestry for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction because the claim had not been presented
to the EEOC.175  To find that the claim had not been presented to the
EEOC, the court relied upon its construction of the administrative
documents Hungate filed:  “Plaintiff repeatedly failed to check availa-
ble boxes indicating a claim for discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or national origin, and did not mention the basis for liability in






172 Hungate v. Winter, 05CV2296, 2007 WL 1975436, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2007).
173 Id. at *1.
174 Id. at *6-7.
175 Id.
176 Id. at *6.
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The court rejected Hungate’s argument that she had exhausted
her administrative remedies as to her Title VII discrimination claim
“by relating the incident where she was told to speak English at work
to [the EEO Counselor].”177  The court held that action did not satisfy
Hungate’s duty to “reveal her intent and provide notice of her
claims.”178  According to the court, her “mere mention of the incident
where [Hungate’s] supervisor told [her] to speak English at work did
not put the EEOC or Defendant on notice of a claim for discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, or national origin.”179  In concluding
that Hungate’s race, color, national origin, or ancestry allegations
were not “like or reasonably related to” the disability allegations, the
court again based its conclusions on Hungate’s EEOC filings, conclud-
ing that her “administrative actions were based on Plaintiff’s allega-
tions of disability discrimination” alone.180
The Hungate order demonstrates that presentment turns on the
content of an administrative charge and later written administrative
materials.  Communicating a claim of race discrimination to a coun-
selor is not enough to present a claim.  Presentment, according to
Hungate, requires that both the potential defendant and the EEOC be
given a very specific kind of notice to allow the plaintiff to later bring
a claim in federal court.  That is, it is not enough to give verbal notice;
written administrative documents are the only way to provide notice
and satisfy the presentment requirement.181
C. Notice Even When No One Is Listening: The Current
Justifications for Administrative Exhaustion Requirements
Fail
Like the Hungate court, other federal courts adjudicating Title
VII claims place great importance on the administrative processes that
precede the filing of a Title VII case and repeatedly mention the
importance of “notice” to both the EEOC and an accused
177 Id. at *5.
178 Hungate v. Winter, OSCV2296 2007 WL 1975436, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2007).
179 Id. at *6.
180 Id. at *2.
181 A recent Ninth Circuit memorandum disposition emphasizes that in determining pre-
sentment courts look to the contents of a written charge and nothing more. See Gonzalez v. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 09-35422, 2010 WL 1539755, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2010) (comparing
allegations in the complaint before it and finding that they were “not described in the EEOC
retaliation charge”).
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employer.182  The Supreme Court has explained that filing an adminis-
trative charge “place[s] the EEOC on notice that someone . . .
believes that an employer has violated” Title VII.183  Notice is pur-
portedly key because once the EEOC learns of a plaintiff’s allega-
tions, employers may be contacted about settling disputes, and,
ideally, litigation will be avoided.184  Courts have further justified their
notice rationale by explaining that Title VII was not meant to create
litigation, but rather to eliminate unlawful employment practices
through informal settlement.185  Under this rationale, informal settle-
ment is presumably impossible without pre-litigation notice of a
charge’s allegation.
Some courts have averred that the presentment requirement is
also justified in terms of notice.186  Putting employers on notice of all
charges against them at the administrative level has been said to pro-
mote resolution of disputes without resort to litigation.187  Violating
the presentment requirement by “[a]llowing a complaint to encom-
pass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge”
would “circumvent” the EEOC’s ability to informally resolve a
charge.188  These justifications fail for several reasons.
First, the presentment requirement bears no resemblance to the
EEOC’s actual investigation.  Enforcing the presentment requirement
in no way defers to the EEOC’s investigatory powers.  The present-
ment requirement allows only those claims like or reasonably related
to the allegations in the charge filed with the EEOC.  The “reasonably
related to” claims are not necessarily those that the EEOC investi-
gated.189  If the EEOC declines to investigate a charge, that decision
“has no bearing on whether the plaintiff has exhausted her adminis-
182 See, e.g., Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co. 887 F.2d 123, 126-27 (7th Cir. 1989).
183 EEOC v. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984).
184 Edwards v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 291 F. Supp. 199, 203 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
185 Id.
186 See, e.g., Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 709-10 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that an employee’s complant must be
presented in a way that provides sufficient notice to allow for administrative measures which
might avoid litigation)).
187 Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332 F.3d 874, 878-79 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Simms v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Dept. of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1327 (10th
Cir. 1999); Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 575 (7th Cir. 1998)).
188 Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1985).
189 B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (accepting jurisdiction
only over “allegations of discrimination that either ‘fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual
investigation or an EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
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trative remedies with regard to that claim.”190  Therefore, a charge
that the EEOC found meritless may still be brought in federal court.
Federal courts are willing to overlook the EEOC’s decision that a cer-
tain claim lacked merit so long as their analysis finds that the claim
was “reasonably related” to the contents of the EEOC charge.  Why
allow claims that the EEOC passed on to be brought in federal court:
Because the “like or reasonably related to” test bears no relation to
the EEOC’s actual practices.
Second, the “like or reasonably related to” test does not limit the
EEOC.  The EEOC may look beyond the charge filed when con-
ducting an investigation.191  It may investigate discrimination affecting
the person who filed the charge, as well as discrimination affecting
others it discovers in the course of its investigation of a single
charge.192  Its investigatory powers are so unfettered that it may “con-
tinu[e] to investigate a charge of systemic discrimination even after
the charging party has filed suit” to pursue its obligation to serve the
public interest.193  The claim the Hungate court so easily dismissed is
one the EEOC could have investigated and attempted to resolve had
the agency come across the claim in the course of its investigation
because the EEOC is not limited to only the subject matter of its ini-
tial investigations.
Thus, the presentment requirement ignores the realities of Title
VII enforcement.  The EEOC lacks the resources to enforce Title VII,
and therefore, private litigants stand in the shoes of the EEOC.  If
private litigants stand in the EEOC’s shoes, they too should not be
constrained by the contents of the initial charge.  As they gather facts
and uncover additional claims, they too should be allowed to amplify
the scope of their investigation.  That is, if a claim was not reasonably
related to the initial charge, there should be no bar to bringing it in a
federal complaint.  Although the EEOC lacks the funds to enforce
Title VII in the way it was intended to and private plaintiffs are left to
stand in its stead, private plaintiffs, even those that have the resources
charge of discrimination’”) (quoting EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.
1994)).
190 Id. at 1099 (citing Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
191 See EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 104, at § 22.3. R
192 EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 558 F.3d 842, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2009).
193 Id. at 852.
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which the EEOC lacks to investigate, are left more restricted than the
agency whose role they are performing.
Third, the “like or reasonably related to” requirement purports to
defer to the EEOC’s superior skill in mediating Title VII claims, for-
bidding the circumvention of its tried and true procedures.  Yet the
EEOC itself has created a mechanism through which an EEOC inves-
tigation can be circumvented.  The EEOC cannot complete most of its
investigations in under 180 days.194  The EEOC will issue a right-to-
sue letter after 180 days if an investigation is still pending and the
plaintiff asks for the letter.195  Therefore, if a certain amount of time
has passed, the EEOC acknowledges that its investigation is not worth
the wait, and its procedures may be circumvented.  Holding a plaintiff
to the charges she filed in her initial complaint, when that plaintiff’s
charges were not pursued by the agency, shortchanges the plaintiff at
both ends.  The plaintiff is denied the thorough EEOC investigation
she was due under Title VII and, furthermore, she is limited to claims
that she may have filed without the help of a lawyer.
Fourth, because the EEOC can neither investigate every charge
filed nor bring suit in every instance in which it determines that a
charge has merit, omitting allegations later brought in a federal com-
plaint from a charge presented to the EEOC does not rob the EEOC
of the opportunity to resolve claims.  The EEOC is not able to take
action on every allegation presented to the agency, so “notice” at the
charge-filing stage is meaningless.  That an allegation is not included
in an original charge does not render the allegation less meritorious or
prevent the EEOC from investigating it.  If the EEOC learns of a key
allegation as the result of an employee’s federal complaint, it is not
barred from taking action based on that knowledge.
Finally, allowing a plaintiff to bring allegations in a federal com-
plaint does not thwart out-of-court settlement.  Parties to Title VII
lawsuits may still engage in court-sponsored settlement and
mediation.
194 Statements of Members of Congress and Other Interested Individuals and Organizations:
Hearing on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2010 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. On Appropriations, 111th Cong. 41 (2009) (statement of Gabrielle
Martin, President, National Council of EEOC Locals).
195 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Filing a Lawsuit, supra note 114. R
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IV. RENDERING PRESENTMENT JURISDICTIONAL VIOLATES
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND FUNDAMENTAL
PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES
The manner in which administrative exhaustion requirements are
enforced varies across the federal circuits.196  Circuits that require pre-
sentment violate the Supreme Court’s approach to  exhaustion
requirements; furthermore, they render presentment, a meaningless
exercise, unwaivable even though personal jurisdiction, a more funda-
mental requirement, may be waived.197  Finally, they improperly
impose heightened pleading requirements on Title VII plaintiffs.198
A. The Supreme Court’s View on Pre-Filing Requirements
As explained above, there are several aspects of administrative
exhaustion in Title VII cases.  First, a timely charge must be filed with
the EEOC; second, a plaintiff must receive a right-to-sue letter; and
third, the allegations relating to Title VII claims in federal court must
track the scope of the EEOC charge.199  The first two requirements
are derived from the language of Title VII itself.200
Title VII requires plaintiffs to seek administrative remedies
before filing suit in federal court.201  Statutes like Title VII that pro-
vide federal jurisdiction over a certain class of claim may also deline-
ate the steps a plaintiff must complete before filing suit.202  These pre-
filing requirements describing what a plaintiff must do before filing
suit are referred to as a statute’s exhaustion requirements.203
By way of review, if an exhaustion requirement in a federal stat-
ute is deemed “jurisdictional in nature,” a failure to exhaust that
administrative remedy typically will deprive a federal court of jurisdic-
tion.204  Other exhaustion requirements, by contrast, are prudential.
196 See infra Part IV.B.
197 See infra Part IV.A-D.
198 See infra Part IV.E.
199 See supra Part III.A-B.
200 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (citing Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5).
201 See Id. at 47.
202 Id.
203 McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969) (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938)).
204 See, e.g., Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 644-46 (9th Cir. 2003) (treating
exhaustion as jurisdictional and dismissing the case when exhaustion had not been satisfied).
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For example, exhaustion requirements that are judicially created are
prudential.205  Courts have also found some statutory exhaustion
requirements to be prudential as well.206  These “prudential” require-
ments can be bypassed under certain circumstances, including by
waiver, estoppel, tolling, or futility.207  If exhaustion requirements are
jurisdictional, they are “a prerequisite to a court’s subject matter juris-
diction,” and “[r]egardless of whether there is a compelling reason a
plaintiff failed to exhaust, a court is without subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the plaintiff’s claim.”208
Title VII is not the only statute for which courts have implied a
presentment requirement.209  The Supreme Court has cautioned that
although the requirement that an issue be presented to an agency is a
common non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement, it is not appropri-
ate to require it in all instances:  “The basis for a judicially imposed
issue-exhaustion requirement is an analogy to the rule that appellate
courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts.”210
That is, in order to be heard on appeal, issues must be raised at the
trial level because the trial court is better equipped to conduct fact
finding.211  In the administrative context, “courts require administra-
tive issue exhaustion ‘as a general rule’ because it is usually ‘appropri-
ate under [an agency’s] practice’ for ‘contestants in an adversary
proceeding’ before it to develop fully all issues there.”212  However,
when an administrative proceeding is not adversarial, the need for
issue exhaustion dissipates.213
In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,214 the Supreme Court held
that Title VII’s timely charge requirement “is not a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute
of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”215
The Court noted that “[t]he provision specifying the time for filing
charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely separate provision, and
205 Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2007).
206 Id. at 175 (citing Buck v. Hampton Twp Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 2006)).
207 Id. at 174.
208 Id.
209 See WRIGHT & KOCH, supra note 49, at § 8398. R
210 Sims v. Apfel,  530 U.S. 103, 108-09 (2000).
211 See id. at 109.
212 Id. (quoting United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 36-37 (1952)).
213 Id. at 110.
214 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
215 Id. at 393.
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it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the
jurisdiction of the district courts.”216  Because the timely filing require-
ment was clearly unrelated to Title VII’s jurisdictional provisions, it
was a not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, but, rather, was
waivable.217
B. Presentment as Jurisdictional Requirement: Circuit Split
The circuits are split on whether the presentment requirement is
a jurisdictional prerequisite.  According to the Fifth Circuit, Zipes did
not address “exhaustion.”218  Rather, it addressed “filing deadlines.”219
In the Fifth Circuit, whether a claim is exhausted is based solely on
whether the presentment requirement has been met.220  However, the
question of whether presentment is jurisdictional is still open in the
Fifth Circuit.221  Unfortunately, this conundrum—establishing subject
matter jurisdiction without presentment, but failing to show exhaus-
tion without presentment—is still good law in the Fifth Circuit.
The Seventh Circuit considers the presentment requirement
“analogous to timely filing requirements and is thus not a jurisdic-
tional rule.”222  In Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., the Seventh Circuit
explained:
The requirement of scope also differs substantially from more com-
mon elements of subject matter jurisdiction, such as whether a com-
plaint presents a federal question or adequately establishes diversity
of citizenship and the requisite amount in controversy.  Subject matter
jurisdiction generally can be determined facially.  In contrast, an
inquiry into the scope of the charge always entails an inquiry beyond
216 Id. at 394.
217 Id. at 398.
218 Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006).
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 788-89.  In this respect, the Fifth Circuit stands on its own.  Even the circuits that
limit Zipes’ application to issues that do not relate to the timeliness of a charge acknowledge that
Zipes is a decision about exhaustion. See Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir.
2007) (stating that Zipes addressed an exhaustion requirement, and citing decisions from “sister
circuits who have commented upon the nature of Title VII exhaustion requirements” in Zipes).
221 Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788 n.7 (“Neither the Supreme Court nor this court sitting en banc
has ruled that the exhaustion requirement is subject to waiver or estoppel, and our panels are in
disagreement over that question.”).
222 Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co.,
773 F.2d 857, 864 (7th Cir. 1985).
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the face of the complaint into the legal characterizations that surround
the barebones of the factual allegations contained in the charge.  In
addition, such an inquiry may require evidence of the breadth of the
EEOC investigation that followed the filing of the charge to deter-
mine whether the charge was adequate to support all of the allegations
advanced in the complaint.223
Thus, presentment is not a jurisdictional requirement in the Seventh
Circuit.
In the Tenth Circuit, an unpublished case has held that present-
ment is a jurisdictional requirement.  Specifically, that court held that
“[a] plaintiff’s claim in federal court is generally limited by the scope
of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to
follow the charge of discrimination submitted to the EEOC.”224
The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that “the failure to file a
timely EEOC administrative complaint is not a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite to a Title VII claim, but is merely a statutory requirement sub-
ject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.”225  Also, the failure to
obtain a federal right-to-sue letter is not jurisdictional.226  However,
“substantial compliance with the presentment of discrimination com-
plaints to an appropriate administrative agency is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite.”227  That is, the statutory prerequisites are not jurisdictional
in the Ninth Circuit, but the sole prerequisite that has no statutory
basis has been deemed jurisdictional.  In the Ninth Circuit, “Subject
matter jurisdiction [only] extends to all claims of discrimination that
fall within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or an EEOC
investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the
charge.”228
But the Ninth Circuit has done further damage.  Although the
Supreme Court has explained that the timely charge requirement is
not jurisdictional, an oft-cited Ninth Circuit case discusses exhaustion
223 Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 863.
224 Dalvit v. United Airlines, Inc., 359 F. App’x. 904, 911 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jones v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007)).
225 Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982)).
226 Surrell v. California Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1105 (9th Cir. 2008).
227 Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 708.
228 Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing B.K.B. v. Maui
Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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without explaining which aspect of exhaustion is jurisdictional.229  In
Lyons v. England, a leading case decided in 2002, the Ninth Circuit
described the administrative exhaustion requirement in the following
terms:
To establish federal subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff is required
to exhaust his or her administrative remedies before seeking adjudica-
tion of a Title VII claim.  Exhaustion of administrative remedies under
Title VII requires that the complainant file a timely charge with the
EEOC, thereby allowing the agency time to investigate the charge.230
This rule statement preceded the Lyons court’s analysis of whether
incidents of discrimination not included in an EEOC charge, but
alleged in a federal claim, were “like or reasonably related to the alle-
gations contained in the EEOC charge.”231  However, Lyons never
explains that the “timely” requirement is not jurisdictional.  As a
result, despite Zipes, district courts in the Ninth Circuit describe both
the “timely” requirement and the “presentment” requirement as juris-
dictional issues.232
Because of this lack of clarity in post-Lyons opinions, the Ninth
Circuit has effectively converted all aspects of exhaustion into jurisdic-
tional requirements.  It has explained that although it “do[es] not rec-
ognize administrative exhaustion under Title VII as a jurisdictional
requirement per se,” the question is reviewable de novo as an issue of
subject matter jurisdiction.233  In other words, each challenge to
exhaustion is treated as a challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion, whether or not the requirement in question is jurisdictional.
However, this take on exhaustion by the Ninth Circuit conflicts
with its prior precedent.  A 1973 case that is still good law, Oubichon
v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., does not treat presentment as an issue
of subject matter jurisdiction.234  In Oubichon, the Ninth Circuit
reversed a district court order that granted dismissal for lack of sub-
229 Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2002).
230 Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
231 Id. at 1104 (quoting Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d
1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir. 1989)).
232 See, e.g., Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that a claim
must ordinarily be presented to the EEOC before a district court can have jurisdiction over that
claim).
233 Vinieratos v. United States, 939 F.2d 762, 768 n.5 (9th Cir. 1991).
234 Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1973).
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ject matter jurisdiction.235  The district court held that the federal
court complaint could not encompass any conduct not alleged in the
initial charge.236  The appellate court reversed, instead holding that “it
is not always clear whether later incidents are reasonably related to or
grow out of earlier incidents on which complaint is made.”237  As a
result, the presentment dispute could not be resolved “as a matter of
law”; rather, a trial was needed to resolve the factual disputes regard-
ing whether allegations in the federal complaint were “like or reason-
ably related” to the underlying charge.238  Under Oubichon, the
presentment requirement was a question of fact.  It was open to
debate.  It was not an unwaivable issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
Oubichon does not stand on its own.  In 1990, Albano v. Scher-
ing-Plough Corp., a Ninth Circuit case that is also still good law, pro-
vided that “equitable considerations may excuse a claimant’s
noncompliance with the scope requirement, and resulting failure to
exhaust administrative remedies . . . .”239  Therefore, the subject mat-
ter rule stated in Lyons is not stare decisis in the Ninth Circuit—it’s
merely misrepresentation of earlier precedent.
Even more disturbing, the Ninth Circuit’s approach, and that of
other appellate and districts courts that require presentment to estab-
lish subject matter jurisdiction, is not following the analysis the
Supreme Court set forth in Zipes.
C. Presentment Is a Prudential, Not Jurisdictional, Requirement
Several circuits entertain or explicitly set forth the idea that the
presentment requirement, and potentially other exhaustion require-
ments, are jurisdictional requirements.240  However, holding that the
presentment requirement is jurisdictional conflicts with Supreme
Court jurisprudence regarding exhaustion requirements.




239 Albano v. Schering-Plough Corp., 912 F.2d 384, 387 (9th Cir. 1990). “It is well-settled
that the failure to file an EEOC charge is not jurisdictional but is merely a condition precedent
to suit.  A claimant’s failure to amend his charge to include a new claim is essentially the same as
a claimant’s failure to file an EEOC charge for the new claim. Framed in this manner, it is clear
that equitable considerations may generally apply to excuse a claimant’s failure to amend his
EEOC charge.”  Stache v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233
(9th Cir. 1988).
240 Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2003).
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First, a jurisprudential presentment requirement conflicts with
the Supreme Court’s holding in Zipes.241  Title VII does not set forth a
presentment requirement.  It requires that the initial charge made to
the EEOC “be in writing under oath or affirmation and shall contain
such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.”242
Just like the timely filing requirement, the content of the charge is not
mentioned in Title VII’s jurisdictional sections.  Indeed, when any
Ninth Circuit opinion notes that the presentment requirement is juris-
dictional, it does so without citation to a statute, even though to be
“jurisdictional,” the requirement must be based on a statutory
provision.243
Applicable regulations provide some guidance regarding what
must be included in an initial charge.244  However, the regulations
make no mention of the requirement that a federal complaint track
the allegations made in the initial charge.245  Even if they did, any such
requirement would not be jurisdictional because the EEOC’s regula-
tions are not binding.246  Because the presentment requirement is
unrelated to Title VII’s jurisdictional provisions, it is not a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to suit, but waivable.
Furthermore, although Sims has not been applied in the Title VII
context, the Court’s conclusions in that case merit consideration in
this context.  Like the proceedings before the Social Security Admin-
istration, a claimant’s relationship with the EEOC is not adversarial.
As noted in Sims, when an administrative proceeding is not adver-
sarial, the need for issue exhaustion dissipates.247  Claimants should be
able to raise new issues for the first time in federal court under Title
VII.
241 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
242 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
243 See supra text accompanying notes 214-217. R
244 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a) (2009).
245 See id.
246 Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., 222 F.3d 247, 257 n.6 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Although the
Supreme Court has held that courts may look to the EEOC’s regulations for guidance, it has
cautioned that the regulations are not binding authority.”).
247 Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110 (2000).
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D. Exhaustion Is No More Significant Than Personal Jurisdiction,
Which Is Waivable
In addition to incorrectly labeling presentment a jurisdictional
requirement, courts that deem presentment a jurisdictional require-
ment elevate this aspect of administrative exhaustion above other fun-
damental procedural principles.  For example, although the
presentment requirement is not waivable, personal jurisdiction is.
This is true even though personal jurisdiction is “an essential element
of the jurisdiction of a district . . . court, without which the court is
powerless to proceed to an adjudication.”248  The Supreme Court has
explained that personal jurisdiction is waivable because it represents a
restriction on judicial power with respect to individual liberty.249  Sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, “serve[s] institutional inter-
ests,” and keeps the federal courts “within the bounds the
Constitution and Congress have prescribed.”250
Forcing Title VII plaintiffs to present all allegations they wish to
bring in federal court before an administrative agency that will likely
never have the opportunity to consider them serves no practical, let
alone constitutional, purpose.  Moreover, unlike personal jurisdiction,
which is waivable, the presentment requirement is not related to any
identifiable liberty.  If personal jurisdiction is waivable, the present-
ment requirement of administrative exhaustion should be as well.
E. Requiring Presentment Violates Principles of Notice Pleading
A Title VII defendant has ample opportunity to complain about
whether he received notice of the charges against him.  Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a federal pleading con-
tain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”251  This aspect of Rule 8 “indicates that a basic
objective of the rules is to . . . require that the pleading discharge the
function of giving the opposing party fair notice of the nature and
basis or grounds of the pleader’s claim and a general indication of the
248 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (quoting Employers Rein-
surance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 382 (1937)) (internal quotations omitted).
249 Id. (“Therefore, a party may insist that the limitation be observed, or he may forgo that
right, effectively consenting to the court’s exercise of adjudicatory authority.”).
250 Id. at 583.
251 FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
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type of litigation that is involved.”252  A defendant is entitled to a com-
plaint sufficient enough to provide him with the ability to respond to
its charges, and no more.253
Requiring that all allegations presented to a federal court also be
presented in an EEOC charge, which is later provided to an employer,
creates a rule of duplicative notice above and beyond what the federal
rules require.  Presentment has become, in effect, a heightened plead-
ing standard, even though the Supreme Court has emphatically held
that there is no heightened pleading requirement in Title VII cases.254
V. PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF CONVERTING EXHAUSTION
INTO A SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION REQUIREMENT
Subject matter jurisdiction is a heady concept.  Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction.  Courts limit the subject matter of the
cases they hear to “keep the federal courts within the bounds the Con-
stitution and Congress have prescribed.”255  For that reason, a subject
matter jurisdiction objection survives trial and appeal; it survives as
long as the litigation itself.256  The edict is clear:  “If the court deter-
mines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court
must dismiss the action.”257
A subject matter jurisdiction objection is a much more powerful
tool for a defendant to have in his arsenal than a mere affirmative
defense.  When an appellate court announces that the presentment
requirement is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, it subjects a
Title VII claim to the risks associated with subject matter jurisdiction.
What is more disconcerting is that the Ninth Circuit introduces the
concept of administrative exhaustion in general as one that deter-
mines the scope of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction without
explaining that the timely filing requirement is not jurisdictional.  In
doing so, the Ninth Circuit has exposed all aspects of administrative
252 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1215 (3d ed. 2004).
253 Id.
254 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007).
255 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999).
256 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (“The objection that a federal court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised by a party, or
by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of
judgment.”).
257 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
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exhaustion to a subject matter jurisdiction objection.  This Part
explains the various consequences that a “subject matter jurisdiction”
label imposes.
Deeming administrative exhaustion a prerequisite to subject mat-
ter jurisdiction is much more than a matter of semantics.  A subject
matter jurisdiction objection or defense can be raised at any time.  It is
a “protected” defense.258  In contrast, an affirmative defense, like a
statute of limitations objection, cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.259  In most federal courts, failure to plead an affirmative
defense in a responsive pleading results in the waiver of that defense
for the course of the litigation.260
This difference can have a tremendous impact on Title VII plain-
tiffs.  Title VII plaintiffs are employees or job applicants suing their
employers or potential employers.  In a Title VII case, their livelihood
is often on the line.  Because a Title VII claim is essentially a claim of
employee versus employer, the employee is generally at a disadvan-
tage because the employer is normally in a more financially advanta-
geous position than the employee.  Lack of financial resources may
force a Title VII plaintiff to appear pro se.261  If not appearing pro se,
a Title VII plaintiff may hire a lawyer who will only work for a contin-
gency fee.  That lawyer may refuse to incur costs that are not
advanced by his financially-strapped client.
At the very early stages of litigation, Title VII plaintiffs may sur-
vive even a motion to dismiss if all aspects of administrative exhaus-
tion are treated as affirmative defenses.  In this scenario, affirmative
defenses would be raised in Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.
258 Erin Murray Watkins, Comment, The Scope of Employment Requirement of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 533, 546-47 (2010) (“Lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion is a protected defense, which means that even if a defendant fails to raise it immediately, he
does not waive the ability to raise it later on.”) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3)).
259 Brannan v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 94 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Failure
to raise an affirmative defense below results in waiver.”) (citing Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
746 F.2d 517, 720 (9th Cir. 1984)).
260 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 252, at § 1278 (“It is a frequently stated proposition of R
virtually universal acceptance by the federal courts that a failure to plead an affirmative defense
as required by Federal Rule 8(c) results in the waiver of that defense and its exclusion from the
case . . . .”).
261 Suzy Fox & Lamont Stallworth, How Effective is an Apology in Resolving Workplace
Bullying Disputes?, 61 DISP. RESOL. J. 54, 60 n.19 (2006) (“A party with less economic power
may be forced to appear without counsel.”) (citing Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost—How the Gil-
mer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12
N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS, 1 (1994)).
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Defendants cannot win such motions by raising factual challenges,262
and whether administrative remedies have been exhausted will be a
question of fact.263  For example, presentment will be decided based
on comparing the charge presented to the EEOC to the federal com-
plaint.  Categorizing administrative exhaustion as a waivable defense
aids disadvantaged plaintiffs at the motion to dismiss stage because all
they must do is raise the argument that the issue is a factual one that
should not be decided by a pleadings motion.  They need not gather
discovery to make this argument.
Moreover, defendants who raise administrative exhaustion at this
stage will have the burden of pleading it.264  All facts will be construed
in a plaintiff’s favor.265  By contrast, if administrative exhaustion is a
matter of subject matter jurisdiction, the burden of establishing juris-
diction will lie with the plaintiff.266
A Title VII plaintiff’s chances worsen as a case proceeds.  If
administrative exhaustion is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, it
can be raised at the summary judgment stage and beyond.267  At sum-
mary judgment, discovery will have already commenced.268  A plain-
tiff’s lawyer working on a contingency fee will not have the same
incentives to gather discovery as will a defense lawyer paid by the
hour.269  Pro se plaintiffs, even if they do gather discovery, will be
262 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[F]actual challenges to a
plaintiff’s complaint have no bearing on the legal sufficiency of the allegations under Rule
12(b)(6).”).
263 Performance Contracting, Inc. v. Seaboard Sur. Co., 163 F.3d 366, 369 n.3 (6th Cir.
1998) (stating that whether administrative remedies have been exhausted is a question of fact).
264 Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Because untimely
exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden
of pleading and proving it.”) (citing Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
265 Lee, 250 F.3d at 679 (“All factual allegations set forth in the complaint ‘are taken as
true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs.’”) (quoting Epstein v. Washington
Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1999)).
266 Ashoff v. City of Ukiah, 130 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997).
267 See, e.g., Brown v. State, No. 08-00470, 2009 WL 2744013, at *5 (D. Haw. Aug. 28, 2009)
(questioning whether the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, but nevertheless granting
summary judgment as to the claim that was not presented in the administrative charge).
268 See, e.g., Glaude v. Gates, No. C08-04317, 2009 WL 2485731, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7,
2009) (discussing presentment aspect of administrative exhaustion raised by defendant at sum-
mary judgment after pro se plaintiff testified about the scope of his claims in a deposition).
269 See Andrea J. Paterson, Fee Agreements: Structuring Alternative Fee Agreements to
Enhance Recovery of Fees and Align Interests of Attorneys and Clients, 35 TEX. ADVOC. 10
(2006) (arguing “most plaintiffs’ attorneys cling to the contingency fee agreement . . . The contin-
gency fee lawyer has an incentive to cut corners. Conversely, a lawyer paid by the hour has an
incentive to ‘over-prepare’ for trial and conduct discovery that might be of marginal utility.”).
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much less skilled than their paid adversaries.270  Moreover, studies
have shown that defendants’ summary judgment motions are granted
more often in civil rights and employment cases than in other civil
cases.271
Even if a defendant fails to raise the issue in his summary judg-
ment papers, this oversight can be remedied by any court that does
not like the plaintiff’s case or believes that it must raise the issue to
ensure that it has jurisdiction.  Any issue implicating subject matter
jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte.272  Labeling administrative
exhaustion a matter of subject matter jurisdiction empowers federal
courts to dismiss a Title VII claim whenever they find an issue with
administrative exhaustion—thus, a jurisdictional issue.273
270 Jessica Case, Note, Pro Se Litigants at the Summary Judgment Phase: Is Ignorance of the
Law an Excuse?, 90 KY. L.J. 701, 703-04 (2002) (arguing “summary judgment can be particularly
difficult for a pro se litigant because the requirements of the [federal summary judgment] rule
are somewhat complex and the pro se litigant may not be aware of her obligation to submit reply
affidavits.”).
271 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Dis-
parate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517,
549 (2010) (“Federal Judicial Center studies of summary judgment practice have determined that
summary judgment is granted disproportionately to dismiss civil rights and employment cases.
(citing Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael Bayl-
son, 3 (Aug. 13, 2008), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/insumjre.pdf/$file/
insumjre.pdf)). In the most recent study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, 77% of sum-
mary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases and 70% of summary judgment
motions in other civil rights cases were granted, in whole or in part, as compared with 61% of
summary judgment motions in torts cases, and 59% of summary judgment motions in contracts
cases. Id. (citing Cecil & Cort, supra, at 9 tbl. 4). Further, 20% of employment discrimination
cases and 10% of other civil rights cases had at least one summary judgment motion granted, in
whole or in part, as compared with 5% of tort and 6% of contracts cases. Id. (citing Cecil &
Cort, surpa, at 16 tbl.11). Additionally, 15% of employment discrimination cases and 6% of
other civil rights cases were terminated by summary judgment, as compared with 3% of torts and
4% of contracts cases. Id. (citing Cecil & Cort, supra, at 17 tbl.12).
Another recent study of Federal Judicial Center database cases for fiscal year 2006 showed
that an employment discrimination plaintiff faced an over 80% likelihood that a summary judg-
ment motion would be granted in whole or in part. Joseph A. Senier, The Trouble with
Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1013, 1033 tbl.C (2009).
272 Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(h)(3) provides that a court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua
sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action, even on appeal.”); Summers v. Interstate
Tractor & Equip. Co., 466 F.2d 42, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1972).
273 See, e.g., Glaude, 2009 WL 2485731, at *6 (granting defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction even though “[n]either party raised
the question of subject-matter jurisdiction in their motion papers or during the motion hearing”
because “a federal court may address a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte” (citing
FED R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3))).
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A Title VII plaintiff also faces an uphill battle on appeal.  The
subject matter jurisdiction objection remains available.  If administra-
tive exhaustion were a question of fact, and the district court had
found in favor of the plaintiff, the issue would be reviewed for abuse
of discretion.  However, a question of law is reviewed de novo.274
Therefore, even if a plaintiff won a favorable subject matter jurisdic-
tion ruling in district court, an appellate court may be more willing to
overturn such a ruling than it would be to overturn a factual determi-
nation.275  If a plaintiff wins a favorable verdict, he will still be
reversed more often than a plaintiff in any other sort of civil case.276
Furthermore, if presentment implicates subject matter jurisdic-
tion, fewer decisions will be reached on the merits. Federal courts
were intended to play a “crucial role” in Title VII’s enforcement.277
They should be developing standards about what is and is not a Title
VII violation rather than aggressively eliminating cases before any
such decision can be reached.  Yet if a case is dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, there will never be any decision on the
merits.  Rather, there will be reams of paper devoted to discussions of
whether a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, but lit-
tle discussion of whether the elements of a Title VII claim have been
met.
274 See Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The district court’s determi-
nation that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administra-
tive remedies is reviewed de novo.” (citing B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2002))).
275 See Francis M. Allegra, Section 482: Mapping the Contours of the Abuse of Discretion
Standard of Judicial Review, 13 VA. TAX REV. 423, 473 (1994) (explaining that with de novo
review, the underlying decision “is protected by a gossamer film, so languid and diaphanous that
a reviewing court finds little to prevent it from substituting its views for those [below]” whereas
under the abuse of discretion standard, the underlying decision “is safeguarded by a kevlar
shield, theoretically all but impregnable to the reviewing court’s prodding, provided that the
[underlying] decision has been forged in a process in which it considered all relevant factors and
balanced those factors in a rational fashion.”).
276 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Fed-
eral Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 111 (2009) (“[T]he appellate
courts reverse plaintiffs’ wins below far more often than defendants’ wins below. The statistically
significant differential exists for appeals from wins at the stage of pretrial adjudication (thirty
percent compared to eleven percent), and it becomes more pronounced for appeals from wins at
the trial stage (forty-one percent compared to nine percent).” (citing Kevin M. Clermont &
Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIR-
ICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 450 (2004))).
277 Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin,
425 U.S. 820, 825-29 (1976)).
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VI. THE DOUBLE WHAMMY OF INEXPERIENCE: TWO POSSIBLE
REASONS WHY COURTS IMPROPERLY REQUIRE PRESENTMENT TO
ESTABLISH SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IN TITLE VII CASES
As detailed above, the proposition that the presentment require-
ment is necessary to establish subject matter jurisdiction stands on
shaky ground.  There are several possible reasons why it has yet to be
questioned.
First, the presentment rule is often introduced as an established
rule of law.  In Lyons, the subject matter jurisdiction rule appears in a
paragraph just below the court’s restatement of the standard of
review.278  It precedes any analysis of the facts of the case before the
court.  Just like the rule of law set forth in the standard of review, the
paragraph representing the subject matter jurisdiction rule lends itself
well to cutting and pasting by authors of later opinions and orders.
The subject matter jurisdiction section is also the portion of an
opinion that may be delegated to a law clerk or, at times, to a judicial
extern still in law school.  When a law clerk or extern needs to state a
rule of law, the rule of law already stated in Lyons fills a need.  The
rule in Lyons, in fact, may already exist in earlier opinions or orders
the law clerk or extern has already written for his or her judge—opin-
ions and orders which are Shepardized, but are otherwise not subject
to much scrutiny.  This subject matter jurisdiction rule is precisely the
kind of rule that may confuse a law clerk or extern who has never
studied employment discrimination let alone administrative exhaus-
tion.  It is easier to just restate the rule as it was applied in an earlier
case.
A second reason hovers over this area of the law.  Much has been
written about “the ideological predilections of federal judges,” and
that “many federal judges have expressed the view that employment
discrimination and civil rights cases are often weak and without
merit.”279  However, there may be a related yet slightly different rea-
son for the judiciary’s treatment of Title VII cases.
When Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to provide coverage to
certain federal employees, it only covered employees in the “competi-
278 Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2002).
279 Schneider, supra note 271, at 519 (citing Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrim- R
ination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 557 (2001)).
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tive service” of the judicial branch.280  However, most court employees
are not in the competitive service.281  In fact, “judicial employees are
among the few remaining groups to be deprived of coverage under
Title VII.”282
If most court employees are not protected by Title VII, then their
supervisors likely do not receive Title VII training.  The effect of
shielding federal judges from the category of American supervisors
who receive discrimination training may be enormous.  If judges are
never subject to sexual harassment training, for example, the only
access to complaints about discriminatory behavior they see are in the
cases before them.
Scholars have noted that “federal judges appointed over the last
few years appear to . . . not identify with employment discrimination
or civil rights plaintiffs—whether because of race, gender, disability,
age difference, or a lack of sensitivity to problems in the workplace,”
viewing these kinds of cases as “petty, involving whining plaintiffs
complaining about legitimate employment or institutional matters,
rather than important civil rights issues.”283  If judges were subject to
training in their own workplace, they might receive added insight into
what modern employment discrimination looks like outside of a court-
room.284  When employers receive sexual harassment or other discrim-
ination training, the training often involves hypotheticals regarding
the very workplace whose employees are receiving the training.
Judges may see Title VII plaintiffs in a different light if they are shown
how discrimination may happen in their own chambers.  They may
280 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2006) (“All personnel
actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . in those units of the judicial branch
of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service . . . shall be made free
from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
281 Lynn K. Rhinehart, Note, Is There Gender Bias in the Judicial Law Clerk Selection
Process?, 83 GEO. L.J. 575, 595 (1994) (citing Eric Neisser, Affirmative Action in Hiring Court
Staff: The Ninth Circuit’s Experience, 26 HOW. L.J. 53, 56 (1983)).
282 Id. at 596.
283 Schneider, supra note 271, at 564 (internal footnote omitted). R
284 Barnard & Rapp, supra note 2, at 667-68 (“The significance of Title VII lies not just in R
the legislated mechanisms created to monitor discrimination in the workplace, but also in the
radical changes to the American work environment inspired by the policies underlying that legis-
lation. . . . Title VII has also drastically shifted notions about generally acceptable verses unac-
ceptable conduct toward co-workers. Thus, in addition to modified workplace protocol has come
an even more radical shift: Title VII has not just changed the face of the American workforce,
but the minds of that workforce as well.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
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become more willing to let Title VII cases be heard on the merits if
Title VII plaintiffs become even the slightest bit more relatable.
CONCLUSION
The presentment requirement does not, at first blush, seem insur-
mountable.  All a Title VII plaintiff must do, after all, is include inci-
dents of discrimination in his EEOC charge to have those same
incidents considered by a federal court.  Courts construe EEOC
charges “‘with utmost liberality since they are made by those
unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading.’”285  In fact, a
court “will consider a plaintiff’s claims to be reasonably related to
allegations in the charge ‘to the extent that those claims are consistent
with the plaintiff’s original theory of the case.’”286
However, these lenient standards are misleading.  Some courts
analyze the presentment requirement in particular and administrative
exhaustion in general as though it were a prerequisite to a court’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.  As a result, any objection a defendant has to
the manner in which a Title VII plaintiff exhausted administrative
remedies may be raised at any time—pretrial, post-trial, and on
appeal.  It is never waived.  If it were a waivable affirmative defense,
defendants would have one opportunity to raise the objection, and
would generally raise it at the motion to dismiss stage, when plaintiffs
have a fair chance of defeating it.
This type of rule is unsound on several grounds. It conflicts with
Supreme Court precedent, and in at least one circuit (the Ninth), has
the effect of unintentionally overruling precedent.  More importantly,
it ignores the reality of the EEOC’s enforcement power.  Title VII
plaintiffs are required to present their allegations to an agency that
lacks the resources to investigate and resolve them.  Yet the rule that
administrative exhaustion establishes subject matter jurisdiction is
copied and pasted into one opinion after another without regard for
what exhaustion actually entails.
The impact of labeling the presentment requirement a prerequi-
site to subject matter jurisdiction ensures that an objection to whether
a plaintiff has presented his allegations to the EEOC before bringing
285 Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting B.K.B. v. Maui Police
Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002)).
286 Id. at 1104 (quoting B.K.B., 276 F.3d at 1100).
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them to federal court survives every stage of litigation.  If a plaintiff
wins at the trial level, he or she may have to defend the scope of the
allegations in a federal complaint at the appellate level.  Title VII
cases should not be subject to uncertainty at every stage of litigation.
Litigation should be the last resort for a Title VII plaintiff.  If it
worked as it is intended to work, the EEOC would either resolve
administrative charges, or bring suit itself.  There is no question that
delayed litigation in which a plaintiff’s verdict is always vulnerable
was not the intent behind Title VII.287
The practical effect of the Ninth Circuit’s rule  is worth consider-
ing.  The Ninth Circuit treats all of the exhaustion requirements as
jurisdictional, a rule with tremendous implications for Title VII cases.
In the 12-month period ending December 30, 2008, more civil rights
cases were filed in district courts in the Ninth Circuit than in district
courts in any other circuit.288
This sledgehammer of a technical rule—the presentment require-
ment is in essence a notice requirement that precedes the federal case
to which it applies—comes down especially hard on Title VII plain-
tiffs.  Title VII was designed to be enforced by private litigants of lim-
ited means, many of whom will continue to appear pro se.  Courts
should not require “absolute compliance with formal pleading
requirements” of these plaintiffs.289  “Suit thresholds warrant interpre-
tation with sensitivity to Title VII’s remedial aims.”290  Title VII was
meant to be accessible to those without legal sophistication.  Those
that forget its history “slight the legislature’s central command.”291
287 Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982).
[T]he legal rules fashioned to implement Title VII should be designed, consistent with
other Title VII policies, to encourage Title VII defendants promptly to make curative,
unconditional job offers to Title VII claimants, thereby bringing defendants into ‘volun-
tary compliance’ and ending discrimination far more quickly than could litigation pro-
ceeding at its often ponderous pace. Delays in litigation unfortunately are now
commonplace, forcing the victims of discrimination to suffer years of underemployment
or unemployment before they can obtain a court order awarding them the jobs unlawfully
denied them. In a better world, perhaps, lawsuits brought under Title VII would speed to
judgment so quickly that the effects of legal rules on the behavior of the parties during
the pendency of litigation would not be as important a consideration.
Id.
288 U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and District, During the
12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2008, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary/2008/dec08/
C03Dec08.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2010).
289 Chung v. Pomona Valley Cmty. Hosp., 667 F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1982).
290 Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
291 Id. (citations omitted).
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Thus, Title VII claims should be easy for private litigants to
bring.292  The Ninth Circuit has stated that “it would falsify the Act’s
hopes and ambitions to require verbal precision and finesse from
those to be protected, . . . .”293  The presentment requirement is the
very kind of technical defense that should not be rigidly enforced
against Title VII plaintiffs, who are meant to act as “private attor-
ney[s] general,”294 and are “the chosen instrument of Congress to vin-
dicate a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.”295
292 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (“When the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the
Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compli-
ance with the law.”).
293 Chung, 667 F.2d at 790 (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 465
(5th Cir. 1970)).
294 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 523 (1994) (quoting Piggie Park, 390 U.S at 402).
295 Id. (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978)).
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